One particular example, built out of the semigroup of doubly stochastic matrices, yields classical but probabilistic computation, helping explain why probabilistic computation can be so fast. Another example is a smaller and entirely $\RR$eal version of the quantum one which uses a (real) rotation matrix in place of the (complex, unitary) Hadamard gate to create algorithms which are exponentially faster than classical ones.
I also articulate a conjecture which would help explain the different powers of these different types of computation, and point to many new avenues of investigation permitted by this model.
We characterize $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_n$ and determine its geometry, topology, and combinatorial structure. For example, we find that $(A,P)\in\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_n$ if and only if $A^tAP=P$. We show that for any $n$, $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_n$ is a connected set, and is in fact piecewise-linearly contractible in $\mathbf{B}_n\times\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_n$. We exhibit two finite decompositions of $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_n$. We derive the geometry of the fibers $(A,\cdot)$ and $(\cdot,P)$ of $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_n$. $\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_3$ is worked out in detail. Our analysis exploits the convexity of $x\log x$ and the structure of an efficiently computable bipartite graph that we associate to each ds-matrix. This graph also lets us represent such a matrix in a permutation-equivalent, block diagonal form where each block is doubly stochastic and fully indecomposable.
We argue that there is a fundamental gap between the stated goals of the TCG's IBC and the central technology that is intended to achieve these goals, which gap is simply that remote attestation asks the attesting platform to answer the wrong question -- the platform is not attesting to its security state, but rather to its execution state, and this underlies all of the troublesome use cases, as well as a number of the practical difficulties, of the TCG world-view. One response to this is to replace standard TCG attestation with property-based attestation (PBA), which places the emphasis on deriving security properties from (potentially) elaborate trust models and conditional statements of security property dependencies. Herein the central rôle for IBC of trust and deriving consequences from precise trust models becomes clear.
Finally, we claim that the TCG's own remote attestation is most properly viewed in fact as a form of PBA, with a certain simple trust model and database of security properties. From this point of view, it becomes clear that IBC can have a much less restrictive range of applications than envisioned merely by the TCG. In fact, with the right ``trust infrastructure'' and sufficiently open software using and relying upon this infrastructure, IBC could actually realize some of the portentous early promises of the TCG for truly increasing the reliability of individual users' platforms and pushing back the apocalyptic rise of malware, especially if platforms and OSes virtualize and enforce some kind of signed code contracts.
In this paper, we argue that the approach of binary attestation is not privacy-friendly, scalable or open and vendor-neutral. The main criticism is that this approach needlessly discloses the complete configuration (i.e., all executed software) of a machine. The focus of binary attestation are the binaries instead of their security. We present a protocol and architecture for property attestation that resolves these problems. With property attestation, a verifier is securely assured of security properties of the verified platform's execution environment without receiving detailed configuration data. This enhances privacy and scalability since the verifier needs to be aware of its few required security properties instead of an huge number of acceptable configurations.
| Jonathan Poritz (jonathan.poritz@gmail.com) | Page last modified: Wednesday, 08-May-2013 19:53:25 MST |